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ABSTRACT
As technology advances businesses are being called upon to take an active role in helping protect
national security. A variety of different companies and industries within the private sector, which
are at the forefront of encryption and hacking technologies, have the option to aid or subvert the
intelligence community by sharing breakthrough technology in the interest of helping ensure
domestic tranquility.
Many industries and companies within the private sector argue that while they are not
actively trying to subvert eff011s to protect national security it is not in their best interest , or the
best interest of their customers, to hand over proprietary technology to the intelligence
community through government enforcement of a court order. As a result of the intelligence
community's need for assistance from the private sector and the private sectors refusal to provide
aid, both parties have turned to the courts for adjudication of the issue.
The ensuing legal battle over this question of who is responsible for protecting national
security will forever change the relationship between the private sector and intelligence . Has the
nature of national security been fundamentally changed as the result of technology and our
information society? More specifically, is the intelligence community and other governmental
agencies solely responsible for protecting national security? Or, in an age of globalization , has
national security become the burden of both public and private actors?
The answers to these questions are complex and at the same time straightforward. What
was discovered was that while the burden of national security falls to both the public and private
sector to an extent. However , it is not the responsibility of the private sector to help protect
national security by virtue of providing the intelligence community with proprietary technology
or information that could compromise the integrity of a given companies business. Furthermore ,

I.

the fight to protect national security is important, living in a country that provides certain safety
assurances helps businesses grow; but when providing that safety prevents people from living
their lives or businesses from operating at their full potential the enemy that the intelligence
community is trying to protect us from has already won.

In developing the answers to these questions, this paper takes a broad view of the players
involved as well as both sides of the legal battle that has already begun. will end with a
discus sion of the options and opportunities that will be available to both parties as the battle over
who should be responsible for helping protect our national security moves forward in the comts.
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INTRODUCTION
On December 2, 2015 fourteen people were killed and twenty-two people were injured
when Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik opened fire at a holiday party in San Bernardino
California. 1 Farook and Malik were killed in a battle with police following the attack, however,
during the subsequent investigation it became necessary for law enforcement officials from the
FBI to obtain a search warrant that resulted in the discovery of an Apple iPhone belonging to
Farook.
That cellphone was locked , the FBI did not have the password , and it did not have the
ability or the technology to unlock the phone. As a result , the FBI sought the assistance of Apple.
Apple uses a high-level encryption software that makes it "near[ly] impossible for the FBI or
Apple or anyone else (except the phone owner) to crack the password." 2 Apple claims that it uses
this level of encryption to protect the privacy of its customers. A statement from Apple reads ,
"For many years, we have used encryption to protect our customers' personal data because we
believe it's the only way to keep their information safe ... We have even put that data out of our
own reach, because we believe the content s of your iPhone are none of our business. " 3 What
makes this case unique from other cases where law enforcement has sought help from third
parties is that Apple doe sn't currently have the means to help. Because of commitment to data
privacy , they do not have the code to unlock the phone. The Justice Department was seeking to
compel Apple to "w rite special software that will override those encrypt ion features in order to

1

"San Bernardin o Shoo ting Updates." Los Angeles Times . December 9 , 2015. Accessed May 02 , 20 17 .
http:// www.la ti mes .com/local /lanow/la-me -l n-san-bernarcl i no-shoot i ng-1i ve- u pda tes- htm l story .html .
~ Ro berts, Jeff John. "Apple vs. the FBr: An Explanation of the Lega l Iss ues ." Does the FBI Have a Strong Legal
Case Against Appl e? Here's an Ana lys is I Fo rtun e.com. Feb ruary 20, 20 16. Acces sed Ma y 02, 2017.
http: //for tun e.co m/2016 /02/ l 8/fbi- iphone / .
3
"Cu stomer Lette r." Apple. Appl e, 16 Feb.2016 . Web . 02 May 201 7. <http s://www.a pp le.com /customer- letter /> .
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peer into the iPhone used by one of the San Bernardino terrorists. " 4 If law enforcement were to
try and extract the information without the software the contents of the phone would be erased
and investigators would lose any potential evidence that may or may not be on the phone.
When App le refused to comply with requests from the FBI , prosecutors from the Justice
Department brought an additional order to the original search warrant before the Central District
Court of California. Fo llowin g the submission of briefs , "in an unusuall y detailed directive,
Magistrate Judge Sheri Pym of the Federal District Court for the District of Central California
ordered Apple to provide "reasonable technical assistance" to the F.B.I. in unlocking the phone. 5
That assistance should have allowed investigators to "bypass or erase the auto-erase function" on
the phone , among other steps, she wrote." 6 Apple appealed the decision following the ruling. The
case died during that appeals process when the FBI found a third party that was willing and able
to break the encryption.
This case is key : it is the penultimate example of the clash that is occuning between the
intelligence community and the private sector over national security. It is about technology that
does not exist. More than that, it is about teclmology that the intelligence community does not
have and or is unable to get - technology that , according to the intelligence community, is vital
to national security. This case also brought this issue to the attention of the public. Legal expe11s
and tech experts alike from Yahoo Finance, Fortune , and FBI Director James Corney touted this
as the test case for big tech and government that would ultimately land on the steps of the
Supreme Colll1 and define the precedent for the coming decades. As Fortune put it in 2016 , "It's
4

Roberts, Jeff Jo hn . "App le vs. the FBI: An Explanati on of the Legal Iss ues ." Does the FBI Have a Strong Legal
Case Again st Apple? Here' s an Analy sis I Fortune.com. February 20 , 2016. Accessed May 02 , 2017.
http://fortune.com/2016 /02/ 18/ fbi -iphone/.
5
Ibid.
6
Benn er, Eric Lichtb lau and Katie. "App le Fight s Order to Un lock Sa n Bernardino Gunman's iPhone ." The New
York Times . February 17, 2016. Acce sse d May 02 , 2017. https:// www.nyt imes.com /2016/02/18 /technology /appletimothy-cook-fb i-san-bernardino.hlml ?_ r=O.
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the biggest tech case of the year, and maybe the decade . .. The outcome will ripple across the
entire technology sector and influence governments around the world." 7 Director Corney , in his
testimony before a congressional intelligence panel, agreed that the ultimate outcome of the
Apple-FBI showdown is likely to "g uide how other courts handl e similar requests. " 8
Whether this is true or not , no one can be certain, but what is certain is that this problem
is not going to go away. Technology is going to continue to advance, national security is going to
continue to be threatened , and the intelligence community will likely continue to fall behind the
curve when it comes to the development of technology that aids in the protection of national
security. As a result , the private sector and public sector need to be ready to address whatever
comes in the future. This will require the achievement of a number of things : (1) it will require
understanding the current internal and external environment of both the intelligence community
and the private sector; (2) understanding the issues that are pre venting cooperation between the
two groups (in essence understanding why the private sector won't turn over the technology
being requested and why the intelligence community is unable to create the technology
themselves); (3) acquiring and in depth knowledge of the legal arguments and national security
implications; and (4) understanding the impacts that comi decisions like the one discussed in the
introduction will have on the private sector in the future.
So, while it might not be possible to decipher the future , it is possible to look at the
players, the issues, the legal arguments, and outline potential scenario s for the future and, in

7

Roberts, Jeff John. "Apple vs . the FBI: An Explanation of the Legal Issues." Does the FBI Hav e a Strong Lega l
Case Against Apple? Here's an Ana lys is I Fortune. co m. February 20 , 2016 . Acce ssed May 02, 2017 .
http ://fortun e .com /2016/02 / 18/fb i-iphone / .
8

Ackerman , Spencer, and Sam Thielman . "FB I director admits Apple encryption case co uld set lega l precedent."
Th e Guardia n. Febru ary 25 , 2016. Ac cessed May 05, 2017.
http s://www .theguardian.com / technolo gy/20 I 6/fe b/25/fbi-di rector-jame s-come y-appl e-e ncrypt ion-ca se- 1egalprec edent.
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doing so, begin to truly understand and answer the question of who is ultimately responsible for
helpin g protect national secur ity.

PART ONE: WHO IS INVOLVED?

6

In examining the question of who is responsible for protecting national security there are
three main entities involved . The first entity is the courts, who are acting as referee between the
two parties. The second entity is the private sector; a preci se definition will be outlined in the
preceding sections . The third and final entity is the intelligence community.
All three of these groups have an interest in protecting national security. For the courts
and the intelligence community it is part of their responsibility and mission to help protect
national security. But what about the private sector? The interest of the private sector protecting
national security comes from the markets. "Marke ts provide a variety of incentives to producers,
their customers, and local communities to guard against a wide range of risks, including the
possibility of terrori sm." 9 However, in the age of globalization the means and extent to which
private companies want to guard against acts of terror and help protect national security is
changing. While companies understand that terrorism has the potentiality to completely destroy a
given business by means of private and social costs, they also understand that there are other
outside costs with helping protect national security. In other words all three entitie s want to
protect national security, they all just have different ways and means by which they believe they
should be able to do so. This section will look at the details of the private sector and the
intelligence community. It will examine the current state of both groups and how the current
state of these groups plays into the ability of each to protect national security.

A) The Private Sector
For the purpos es of this paper, the private sector is a term used to describe non-governmental
actors that are engaged in a variety of different sectors of business in the United States and
internationally. The private sector can also be referred to as private industry. Some of the key
9

Farmer, Richard D. "Homelan d Securit y and the Private Sec tor." A CBO Pap er. December 2004. Acces sed May 4,
2017. hltp: //www .cbo.gov/s ites/default/file s/cbofile s/ftpdocs /60xx/cloc6042/ 12-20 -home land sec urity .pdf.
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companies within this sector come from the sub-sector of inform ation technol ogy (or tech)
sector. This sector, as well as several others, are respon sible for the production of a variety of
technologies that can be used or are relevant to the intelligenc e community 's mission to prote ct
national securit y.
The information technology sector is comprised of eight different industries. Those
industries include: (1) communications equipment ; (2) electronic equipm ent, (3) instrume nts and
components; (4) internet software and services; (5) IT serv ices, (6) semi-condu ctors and
semiconductor equipment; (7) softwa re ; and lastly, (8) technology hardware, storage and
periph erals. 10 Major compa nies in this sector includ e Appl e, Samsung Electronic s, Foxconn ,
Amazon.com , Alphabet Inc. (parent company of google) , Dell Technologies , and LG. Some of
the se companies are based internationally and some are based dome stically. However they all are
global corporations with research and development facilities in the United States or technolo gies
that are overwhelmingly used within the United States. As PwC indicates on its website Strategy
&, "The tech indu stry is always in flux. Frequent new products and category innovation define

and redefine the sector 's con stantly shifting land scape. But lately [it has seen] seen even greater
volatility than usual, and it has begun to affect the makeup of hardwar e and software companies
them selves" .

11

With such fierce competition , companies are in constant battle for the next big

thing. Once the y find it they are then in a race against the clock to protect it. In an article written
for the Harvard Business Review , "The New Logic of High-Tech R&D ", Gary Pisano and
Steven C. Wheelwright have shown that:
10

"Informat ion Techno logy Secto r - Find Invest ment s." Find Investme nts in the Informa tion Technol ogy Sector Fide lity. Accessed May 02 , 20 17.
https://e resea rc h .Fide lity .com/e research/ markets_ sec tors /secto rs/s ector s_ i n_market j htm I?tab=i n vestment s§o r=45.
11
Casey, Henning Hag en Thomas . "2015 Techn ology Indu stry Trends." Stra tegy& - the glo bal strategy cons ultin g
team at PwC. January 22 , 20 15. Accessed May 02 , 2017. https:// www. strategyand.pwc .com/tre nds/20 15tec hnology-tre ncls.
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Innovative proce ss technologies are an underexploited way for organizations to
protect and extend the proprietary position of their products . Great new products
are two-edged swords. They create new market s, attract buyers willing to pay
premium prices, and enable a company to generate significant profits. The better
and more successful the product, however, the more competitors strive to imitate
it. And imitators can be swift and ruthless. Companies have traditionally fended
off imitators with patents, but patents rarely provide complete protection. 12
In other words, the sector is extremely competitive and volatile , making the limited protections
that patent s and copyrights give to proprietary material extremely valuable. As such it becomes
problematic when intelligence agencies then request proprietaiy technology which then could be
released, leaked, or used in a way that diminishes its value to customers within the sector.
Companies have little incentive to cooperate with public authorities since maintaining their
value , market share, and customer base is a priority. A company wanting to protect its assets is
fine on its own merits. Every company within the sector has an obligation to its shareholders to
keep the compai1y profitable , but what happens when the intelligence community needs that
information to protect national security? A key problem is thi s inherent conflict between
company survival and national security.

B)

The Intelligence Community
The intelligence community (IC) is comprised of seventeen different organizations directed

by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). 13 The intelligence community operates on a
disclosed budget of approximately 70 billion dollars each year. Other estimates add an additional
billion dollar s in funds for classified line items that cannot be disclosed. In 2010," the

Washington Post did a two-year investigation of the cunent state of the intelligence community.
Durin g that inve stigation , the Post found "so me 1,271 government organizations and 1,931

12

Wheelwright , Gary P. PisanoSteven C. "The New Logic of High-Tech R&D." Harva rd Business Review. Jul y 3 1,
2014. Acce sse d Ma y 02 , 20 I 7. http s:// hbr.or g/1995/09/ the-new-logic- of -high -tech-rd.
13
"ODNI Home. " Ho me. Accessed May 03, 2017. https://www.dn i.gov/ index .php/ what -we-do/ ic-budge t.
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private companies work on programs related to counterte1rnrism, homeland security and
intelligence in about 10,000 locations across the United States. An estimated 854,000 people,
nearly 1.5 times as many people as live in Washington, D.C. , hold top-secret security
clearance s." 14 That number has only grown since 2010.
The rapid growth and expansion of the intelligence community can be directly linked to the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.
The Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency , for example, has gone from 7,500
employees in 2002 to 16,500 today. The budget of the National Security Agency,
which conducts electronic eavesdropping , doubled. Thirty-five FBI Joint
Te1rnrism Task Forces became 106. With the quick infusion of money , military
and intelligence agencies multiplied ... In all at lea st 263 organizations have been
created or reorganized as a respon se to 9/11. 15
The rapid expansion of the IC also included the rapid expansion of the bureaucracy that must
surround all parts of the federal government. This expansion was deemed nece ssary for the
prot ection of national security. U nfo1tunately , there is little data to prove whether or not the rapid
expansion of the IC has led to a safer America. The intelligence community cannot broadcast its
succe sses, but everyone knows about its failures. With the rapid growth of personnel within the
intelligence space, one would think that the IC would not need the help of the private sector. The
problem is that more people does not neces sarily mean more solutions. In a globalized and
increasingly interdependent world , even with 854,000 people, the IC still needs to consult
outside resources.

C)

Moving Forward

14

Priest , Dan a, and William Arkin. "A Hidden World Growing Out of Co ntrol. " The Washingt on Post . 2010.
Acce ssed May 03 , 2017. http ://proje cts.was hin gton pos t.com/top -secre t-america/ar ticles /a-hiclclen-world -growing beyond-control/2.
15
Ibid.
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So why is it necessary to understand the actors involved? It is necessary to understand the
private sector and the intelligence community because the make-up of both entities is completel y
different. They operate differently , have different priorities , and are motivated by different goals
and incentives. Despite this, both groups benefit from a safe America. Business benefits because
private business operates at its best in a safe environment. Markets and businesses hate
uncertainty and risk. As such they have an inherent buy-in at helping protect national security; if
it helps them ensure a safe operating environment, which could lead to higher profits.
Given this common interest, one is left to wonder why won 't the intelligence community
and the private sector play ball? On its face, some would think that there is no reason for the two
not to cooperate as then President Obama put it, "we' re going to need the tech community, the
software designers , the people who care deeply about this stuff to help us solve it. Because what
you'll find ... is that after something really bad happens , the politics of this will swing, and they
will become sloppy, and rushed , and it will go through Congress in ways that have not been
thought through.".

16

Others argue that the only reason that the private sector won't help is

because of concern for loss of profits. People opposing Apple 's stance are saying that Apple may
well lose some business over this. At the time of the incident President Trump called for a
boycott until Apple agreed to help the FBI; subsequently many paity faithful are claiming that
the company is "building phones for te1rnrists." 17 Still others would argue that the intelligence
community is seeking the technology of the private sector solely because they want the
proprietary technology to keep tabs on the lives of ordinary Americans . This case in particular
has the potential for massive government intrusion in the lives of everyday Americans and in the
16

Elmer -DeW itt, Philip. "What Obama Sa id About Apple vs . FBI at SXSW." I Fo rtune.co m. March 14, 2016 .
Accessed May 05 , 20 I 7. http: //fortune.com /2016/03/ I 2/o bama-sxsw-apple -vs-fbi/ .
17
CNBC. "Trum p calls for Apple boyco tt. ..while usin g iPhone. " CNBC. February 19, 2016 . Acce ssed May 05,
2017. http://www.cn bc .com/2 0 l6/02/ l 9/trump -ca lls-for-ap ple-boycott. htm l.
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private sector. As Apple said in one of its briefings , "If the gove rnment can invoke the All Writs
Act to compel Apple to create a spec ial operating system that undermines important security
measures on the iPhone, it could argue in future cases that the courts should compel Apple to
create a version to track the location of suspects , or secretly use the iPhone's microphone and
camera to record sound and video." 18 Additionally , Apple proffers that "Once the process is
created , it provides an avenue for criminal s and foreign agents to access millions of iPhones.
And once developed for our government , it is only a matter of time before foreign governments
demand the same tool." 19
This particular tension that exists between the intelligence community and the private
sector once again brings up the age-old debate between security and libert y. Those erring on the
side of liberty are more likely to side with Apple and the private sector fighting against the
oveneach of govenm1ent. While others will side with the intelli gence community who have
decided that capitalism and the decentralization of information and authority are no longer in the
interest of protecting national secur ity.
The reality is that simplicity of those arguments do not take into account the full context
of the issue. The question of who should be responsible for helping protecting national security
does not come down to profit and loss, it doe s not come down to who has the most resources ,
rather it comes down to a series of factors and issues that are putting both entities at odds against
one another.

PART TWO: ENEMIES UNKNOWN
18

Domono ske , Cam ila, and Alina Selyukh. "App le V s. The Government , In Their Own Word s." NPR. March lO,
20 I 6. Accessed Ma y 05 , 20 17 . http: //www. npr.org/sec tion s/thetwo-way/2016/03/10/469994735/app le-vs-thegove rnmen t-i n-the ir-own -wo rds.
19
Ib id.
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In addressing the question of who is responsible for helping protect national security it is
not uncommon to try and figure out who the good guy is and who the bad guy is. In this case the
bad guys are not the private sector nor the intelligence community , it is the people that are
putting the two at odds against one another. It is the common enemy of both entities , it is the
enemies of the United States who seek to cause terror and bring misfortune and pain to the
citizens of this country. It is impossible for the United States intelligence community to process
every piece of data, every report , and every intelligence communication. There is just too much
information .
Due to the inability of the IC to provide 100 percent protection and security; it is not
surprising that acts of terror occur every day , all across the globe, It is the reality of the world as
it exists today. In the case of San Bernardino, the terror committed in that office space was
committed by two people with guns. The technology at issue in that case was not the guns but
the phone that was in the pocket of one of the shooters. The attack was not technologically
complex, but the phone was and it prevented the FBI from getting info1mation that it needed in
the case that was vital to national security . Technology that may be mundane in its day to day
existence can now become the key to unlocking the next big clue.
This time it was guns , the next time there is an attack on the United States it might be an act
of cyberwarfare. In a statement to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs , Robe11Anderson , Jr. (the acting Executive Assistant Director , Criminal,
Cyber, Response , and Services Branch , of the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation) stated that, " We
face cyber threats from state-sponsored hacker s, hackers for hire, global cyber syndicates , and
terrorists. They seek our state secrets, our trade secrets, our technology , and our ideas-

things of

incredible value to all of us. They seek to strike our critical infrastructure and to harm our

13

economy. Given the scope of the cy ber threat , agenci es across the federal government are
making cyber security a top priority " .20 Enemi es of the United States do not telegraph their next
rn:oves; they do not send us warning s about the means by which they intend to perpetrate their
next attack . The enemy now has options, and becaus e of this the intelligence community has no
way of guaranteeing that the technology that they currently possess is going to be the most
relevant or the most adequate in the protection of national security . Moreover, because of the
variety of weapon s available to our enemies the intelligence community is struggling to handle
every potential threat that come s their way. Whether they know it or not, whether they intend to
or not , the enemie s of the United States are winning because they are turning natural allies
against one another. Both the intelligence community and the private sector are trying to respond
to enemie s unknown and still meet policy goals and profit margins .

PART THREE: THE COURTS
20

Sa nge r , David E . "Chin ese C urb Cyberat tac ks on U.S . Interes ts, Repor t Find s." The New York Times. Jun e 20 ,
2016 . Accesse d May 03, 201 7 . htt ps://www .nytime s .co m/2 0 16/06/2 l/u s/po litics/c hina -us-cybe r-spying.html
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In answering the question of who is responsible for protectin g national security the
answer must ultimately come from the courts , and it is likely that decision will come down from
the Supreme Court. But the question that the Supreme Cou11will answer will not be
' who is respon sible for helping prot ect national security?" The question th at they will answer is:
does the private sector have to comply with court orders that mandate them to give proprietary
technology to the government in the interest of national security or in the interest of helping law
enforcement with criminal prosecution? This section will examine two relevant case studies that
will help to unpack the legal arguments surrounding the issue. In addition, the section will look
at amicus briefs that a variety of different groups have submitted. In under standing the legal
arguments , the question of who is respon sible for helping to protect national security can be
answered , becaus e until Congress ways in or either side surrenders fully the courts will have the
final say in the matter

A)

Case Study 1
There are two pertinent cases that we can look to for guidance in this matter: cite them both

here . This section will cover the first of tho se two cases.
The facts regarding this case (In the matter of the search of an Apple iPhone seized during

the execution of a Search Warrant on a black Lexus 1S300, California License Plate 35KGD203)
are explained in the introduction. In brief: a cellphone belonging to one of the attackers in the
San Bernardino terrori st attack was discovered through the course of the investigation. Upon
receipt of that cellphone the FBI came to discover that they were unabl e to unlock that device.
They would need to request the help of Apple, the maker of the phone in question , to unlock the
phon e in the intere st of national secmity. What mak es this case different is that, as a result of
newer and more advance encryption , Apple did not have the technolo gy to unlock the phone

15

either. When Apple refused to aid the FBI with their request the FBI went to the courts , seeking
an order that would compel Apple to create the technology needed to unlock the phone. Upon
receipt of the arguments by both partie s, "U .S. Magistrate Judge Sheri Pym of U.S. District
Court in Los Angeles ruled that Apple must provide "reasonable technical assistance" to
investigators seeking to unlock the data on Farook's iPhone SC."

21

Apple proceeded to appeal

that decision . As the appeals process moved forward the FBI was able to find a third-party
vendor that was actually able to unlock the phone. At this point the case was moot, but it still
provides a wealth of legal information for this case and other cases that are pending before courts
across the United States in which the intelligence community (through the federal government) is
requesting the same level of compliance from Apple and others like them.
a) Legal Arguments
In lookin g at some of the broader legal arguments made in the case: prosecutors on behalf of
U.S. Attorney's office argue that the order should be granted under the "All Writs Act" or A WA.
In brief the AW A gives the Supreme Court and all courts the power to issue necessary and
appropriate writs in aid to their jurisdiction.

22

In essence the Act gives comts the blanket

coverage that is necessary to help agencies perform their given tasks by compelling others to act
as long as the action required is within the confines of the law. Apple , in contrast, has argued that
the order should not be granted. They view the order as a violation of the company 's First ,
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. Both patty's arguments have merits but must be examined
in further detail to get a clearer picture.
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1.

First Amendment Arguments

As CNN Tech put it, "The [First Amendment] legal argument Apple is expected to use can
be summed up like this: Code is protected speech, so the government can't compel Apple to write
a new version of i OS any more than it can force an author to write a story. "

23

In other words

App le does not want to write the story and the government cannot force them to write it. In
arguing the First Amendment violation , Apple could potentially cite Bernstein v. Department of

Justice. In that case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the code in a
24

developer's software was protected by the First Amendment " . While this case is not a Supreme
Court case, it is the close st that any court has necessarily come to in terms of a definitive answer
on the question of code being free speech.
While the arguments are viable they are by no means full proof. The tech giant would "have
to overcome years of precedent in the way that companies work with law enforcement " 25 . Apple
itself has worked with law enforcement officials in the past. They must prove that this case is
different and that there is a difference in the code that they were previously willing to provide
and the code that they are currently being asked to provide. The biggest argument that they can
make on that score, is that the code that they provided in other cases had already been written
and was in existence. In this case , the code does not exist and Apple has never before provided
authorities with newly written code upon request.
Secondary to the free speech argument is the 1994 Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act. The Act states that law enforcement lacks the power "to require any specific
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design of equipment, facilities , services , feat ures, or system configurations to be adopted by any
provider of a wire or electronic communication service" .26 The relation ship being that as a result
of the act not requiring specific "language " in programming , the gove rnment ha s no right to
require this kind of " language " or code from Appl e.
ii. Fourth Amendment
As Grady Lowman writes in an aiiicle for Rutgers Journal for Law and Policy, "Ap ple
champion ed its consumers' privacy right s in the media . But the conc ern ov er consumers ' privac y
rights that has been so preva lent in the media is myster iou sly absent where it really matters -in
court"

27

(To an extent the argument was brought in Court , but it mainly play ed out in the eyes of

the media and was acknow ledged in several decisions). In asserting jus tertii doctrine Apple
would be allowed to "asse rt the cons titutional right s of their con sum ers, eve n thou gh the
consumers aren't paii of th e law suit"

28

In 2014 the Supreme Court recognized a "constitutional

privacy intere st in cell phon e data", this prot ection went beyon d the initial grant of the wairn nt
because of the ability of the government to obtain mor e information than the warrant would
authorize. As Lowman put s it, "The concern is that , if the FBI success fully forces Apple to
create a backdoor , the government will use this as precedent for caiie blanche access to lock ed
phon es in the future , creating Fourth Amendment issues not only in the way the phone is
accesse d, but the potential for over-seizing data ", thu s uprooting the constitutional privacy
interes t in cellphone data.
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The opposing argument to this being that the FBI is asking for extremely narrowly tailored
access to the code for thi s one specific phone. So the threat of carte blanche Fomih Amendment
violations does not exist. Prosecutors would further argue that they aren 't trying to tell Apple
exactly how to build the software so there is nothing stopping Apple from writing protocol s into
the code that would only give law enforcement access to this singular phone. The problem
complicating that argument, is that Apple is saying that the software that would allow for single
acces s does not exist , and there is no way to know if the software can be built to only unlock one
phone. The argument s in the case regarding the Fourth Amendment would be left to unknown
circumstances and arguments of what if.
But it is imp01iant to note , that in this case the potentiality for Fourth Amendment violations
did not stop the judge from compelling Apple to assist in the case. The judge was convinced that
the program could be narrowly tailored enough not to infringe on the Fomih Amendment right s
of Apples customers.
iii. Fifth Amendment
In regards to the Fifth Amendment , Apple ' s attorneys argue , "By con scripting a private pmiy
with an extraordinarily attenuated connection to the crime to do the government' s bidding in a
way that is statutorily tmauthorized , highly burdensome, and contrary to the party's core
principles , [the govenunent's request] violate s Apple's substantive due process right to be free
from the "arbitra1y deprivation of [its] libe1iies" . 29 In other word s, Apple is saying that they
have no direct connection to the San Bernardino shooting, and as a private entity there are no
laws that outline the comi ' s ability to compel or conscript them into action.
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The counter to this argument that could be made by prosecutors is a nod to tradition. As
Justice Department spokesperson Melanie Newman said in a statement, it doesn't matter that
Apple and the shooting are not substantiall y related; there is no due process violation as, "Law
enforcement has a longstanding practice of asking a court to require the assistance of a third
party in effectuating a search warrant ... When such requests concern a technological device, we
narrowly target our request to apply to the individual device. In each case, a judge must review
the relevant information and agree that a third paiiy 's assistance is both necessary and reasonable
to ensure law enforcement can conduct a court-authorized search". 30
iv. All Writs Act
The All Writs Act of 1789 is the central argument of the federal government in cases like this
one. The All Writs Act was established "to ensure courts in colonial America had the same
traditional powers as those in England ". 31 It is the opinion of some that the "The feds just want
the court , like courts have on many other occasions, to use its power under the Act to get Apple
to comply with the search warrant ". 32
This is case is not the first in which the government says that the All Writs Act gives "broad
latitude to judges to request "third parties " to execute court orders".
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There are currently nine

open cases involving Apple and other teclmology companies that involve the AW A compelling
the companies to act on behalf of the government to provide a variety of information or
intelligence from their products.
30
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In contrast to the broad latitude argument, Apple argues that the act has "strict limits" which
are supp01ied by precedent. Precedent concerning it will be discus sed a little bit later. But the
second part of Apple's argument is that Apple believes that the court won't order the company to
act "if it concludes the company is "so far removed from the underlying controversy" or if would
place an "unreasonable burden " on Apple".

34

Apple argues that the company is far removed

from the underlying crime because they had nothing to do with the shooting and there is no
definitive proof there is evidence of the crime on the phone , there is only speculation.
Furthermore, the phone s service provider has been able to provide phone logs and texts , but there
has been no evidence that the phone itself offers any additional proof of the crime. Apple also
has grounds to argue that the order would present an unreasonable burden to the company. Thi s
unreasonable burden comes as the result of two different factors. The first factor would be the
burden of Apple having to come up with the code and software to unlock the phone. As has been
stated the code does not exist so Apple would have to devote the time, the money , and the
energies to create the code , creating an undue burden . The second factor is the burden that the
order will place on Apple 's revenue. The company has marketed for years on its ability to
provide privacy to its customers. If Apple is compelled to comply and the program is out there it
can no longer guarantee this privacy to its customers. This could cost Apple customers and
market share, place an undue burden on Apple and its shareholders. The judgement of the
legality of the order under the All Writs Act will mainl y be determined by the latitude that the
court gives to its interpretation .
In terms of precedent regarding the All Writs Act argument the courts has gone both ways.
The government cited a 1977 ruling requirin g phone companies to help set up a pen register, a
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device that records all numbers called from a particular phone line.35 This was a case where the
company was compelled to assist the government under the act and the court sustained the order
under a broad interpretation. In another case, cited by Apple this time, in 2005, a federal
magistrate judge rejected the argument that the law could be used to compel a
telecommunications provider to allow real-time tracking of a cellphone without a search
36

warrant ". So, when it comes to the All Writs Act there is no clear precedent for the courts to
follow .
b) Conclusions
Had this case gone through the appeals process there is little doubt that it would have gone
all the way up to be the Supreme Comi. Prior to settling out of court this case was slated to set
precedent for the intelligence community and the private sector for the next decade. While there
is no guarantee what the exact arguments of the pmiies would have been or what the result of the
case would have been it would have provided a strong preced ent.
B) Case Study 2
a. Legal Arguments
The second case occurred in the United States District Court, Eastern District of New in
February of 2016. In this incidence , a suspect by the name of Jm1Feng had been arrested and
brought before the comi on drug charges. During the course of the investigation Feng 's iPhone 5
was lawfully obtained by the police. The phone was not of immediate value to law enforcement.
But as the case proceeded law enforcement believed that they needed to be granted access to the
phon e. Unforttmately, law enforcement was not able to gain access to the information on the
35
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phone due to the phones password protection and safety measures . Following an unsuccessful
consultation with the FBI, law enforcement in New York requested the assistance of Apple. As
such the State sought an order requiring Apple , to bypass the passcode security.

37

It was asserted

that such an order would assist in the execution of a search warrant previously issued by the
court , and that the All Writs Act , 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (the "AWA"), empowered the court to
grant such relief.

38

(The All Writs Act was also used in the main argument of the state regarding

the San Bernardino shooting which will be discussed at length in the following sections.) Apple
in opposition argued that the state did not meet the minimum requirements outlined within the
act, and could not prove the factors necessary for the court to order compliance under the AW A.
What is interesting about this particular case, and something that is impmiant to the its judgment ,
is that while the proceedings were occmTing between Apple and the government to let them
unlock the iPhone the suspect in the case plead guilty to charges. But rather than the order
becoming a moot issue, government still sought the order requiring Apple to unlock the device.
The reason that they still wanted the phone was for the purposes of sentencing and for use in the
trials of Mr. Feng ' s co-conspirators in the case. With that being said, in February of2016 U.S.
Magistrate Judge James Orenstein ruled against the govenunent denying the motion.
In evaluating the ruling there are several key features that stick out; and are important to
the ultimate question of should govenm1ent be allowed to compel private companies in assisting
with matters of national security. While this was not a matter of national security , it is indicative
of some of the same arguments. In this motion , the judge "applied previous legal decisions
interpreting th e AW A and concluded that the law does not 'j ustif[y] imposing on Apple the
37
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obligation to assist the government ' s investigation against its will." In a formulation extremely
favorable to Apple, the judge wrote that the key question raised by the government' s request is
whether the AW A allows a court "to compel Apple - a private party with no alleged
involvement in Feng's criminal activity - to perform work for the government against its
will."39 It was the belief of this judge that the law does not permit the concluding result- "both
becau se relevant law contains limit s on what companies like Apple are required to do, and
becau se Congress never enacted any such obligations."

40

Now had Congress enacted such obligations this would be a completel y different story.
But the point of the matter is that the government did not show enough evidence in support of
their application und er the All Writs Act. For an A WA application to be successful it must
establish the following factors:
1. the closene ss of the relationship between the per son or entity to whom the
propo sed writ is directed and the matter over which the court ha s juri sdictio n;
2. the reasonablenes s of the burden to be imposed on the writ's subject; and
3. the necessity of the requ ested writ to aid the court's jurisdiction (which does replicat e the
second statutor y element , despite the overlapping language).
See N. Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 174-78.
In reviewing this motion , the judge held that "Apple had no involvement in Feng ' s crime, and
it has taken no affirmative action to thwart the government's investigation of that crime.
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In

addition, "App le lawfully sold to Feng, as it sells to millions of law-abiding individuals and
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entities (including the government itself), a product that can effectively sec ure its stored data
for the protection of its owner ," and "Feng used that device for criminal purpose s and left it
locked ".42 The ruling also emphasized that:
"Apple is not 'thwar ting ' anything - it is instead merely declining to offer
assistance." While a party may - or may not - have a moral duty to assist the
government in criminal investigations , "not hing in [prior case law] suggests that
the ' duty ' ... is lega l rather than moral." Particularly since Congress has
explicitly authorized companies to produce telecommunications devices with
security mea sure s, there is no basis to conclude that Apple has done anything
wrong by enabling its customers to lock their devices. " 43
The lack of relationship between Apple and Feng was recognized by the judge and as such was
a strike against the criteria for an AW A ruling.
Second , when it comes to the matter of ' reasonablenes s of the burden ' impo sed on the
subject , "the rulin g recognized that forcing Apple to compromise its own secmity systems at
the behest of the U.S. governme nt would impose a con siderab le cost far beyo nd financial
expense ".

44

Third , the nece ssity of the writ was called into que stion as a result of Feng already

having plead guilty.
The arguments that the government made in this motion are extremely simi lar to other
cases that have come before the court in recent months regarding similar reque sts of
compliance from Apple. And the judg e took notice of this fact. In his ruling Judge Orenstein
wrote the following:
"The Application before this court is by no means singular: the government has
to date succes sfully invoked the A WA to secure Apple 's compelled assistance
4
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in bypassing the passcode security of Apple devices at least 70 times in the past;
it has pending litigation in a dozen more cases in which Apple has not yet been
forced to provide such assistance; and in its most recent use of the statute it goes
so far as to contend that a court - without any legislative authority other than
the AW A - can require Apple to create a brand new product that impairs the
utility of the products it is i11the business of selling.

It is thus clear that the government is relying on the AW A as a source of
authority that is legislative in every meaningful way: something that can be
cited as a basis for getting the relief it seeks in case after case without any need
for adjudication of the particular circumstances of an individual case (as the
arguments that the government relies on here to justify entering an AWA order
against Apple would apply with equal force to any instance in which it cannot
bypass the passcode security of an Apple device it has a warrant to search)." 45
Even more disturbing to the judge was the government's claim that because Apple is a U.S.
company and receives benefits from the United States it has duty or a moral obligation to assist
the U.S Government and the intelligence community. On this score that judge states:

"Such argument reflects poorly on a government that exists in part to safeguard
the freedom of its citizens - acting as individuals or through the organizations
they create - to make autonomous choices about how best to balance societal
and private interests in going about their lives and their businesses. The same
argument could be used to condemn with equal force any citizen's chosen form
of dissent. All American citizens and companies "derive significant legal,
infrastructural, and political benefits from [their] status [as such]" - but that
cannot mean that they are not burdened in a legally cognizable way when forced
unwillingly to comply with what they sincerely believe to be an unlawful
·
·
,, 46
government mtrus10n.
C) Conclusions
What he writes in his ruling truly embodies the overall since of what is happening in cases like
this across the country. Government is using the AW A as means by which they can legislate
from the courts. If they were to succeed , they would be forcing Apple and companies across
the private sector to help protect national security through court ordered compliance. The
45
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essential ethical point that the judge is making her e is that mandated government intrusion into
the private sector goes against the foundations of freedom that the country is founded upon .
Furthermore, Apple choosing not to cooperate is not and should not be viewed as an effort of
the comp any to support crime or terrorism. Apple did what they believed was right and acted
within the bounds of the law in an effort to do maintain the protection of their customers
privac y as well.

C) Amicus Briefs
While the legal arguments made by both parties in the two case studies that have been
outlined and discussed are of the utmo st importance - in our case - the arguments of the two
partie s are not the only ones of relevance to us. In other words, the voices that are not directl y
related to this question can be incredibl y insightful. The sheer number of groups that came out in
support of Apple are tellin g. In total seventeen different bodies wrote amicus briefs in support of
Apple and four additional individuals wrote letters to the courts . Some of these briefs were solely
for the use of the San Bernardino case and some were used in both of the case studies outlined
above. Some of the briefs come from groups such as: The ACLU, Amazon, AT&T the Center for
Democracy and Technology, The Media Institute , and Privacy International and Human Rights
Watch. All of these different groups in one voice stood up to say that they supported Apple and
that they believed in some way that private industr y is not responsible for national security.
Moreover, they believe that the government is misund erstanding the original intent of the All
Writs Act and that implementation of such a preced ent would be bad for the economy, bad for
the economy, and ultimatel y bad for the goverm11ent.
For example, the ACLU argue s that the governmen ts interpre tation of the All Writs Act
is at its best wrong, and at its worst a make shift power grab for the government to compel third
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party compliance in the intere st of national security. In a blog outlining their amicus brief the
ACLU writes:
"That law gives courts the authority to issue orders necessary for it to fulfill its
judicial role and enforce its decisions. It does not, however, permit courts to give
law enforcement new investigative tools that Congress has not authorized. In this
case, the act can't be used by law enforcement to give itself the unprecedented
power to conscript an innocent third party into government service against its
will. The use ofthis law is made all the more sweeping considering the vast
cybersecurity and privacy implications of what the government wants to be able
to do."

47

The concerns that ACLU brings to the table are ones of government overreach. The brief goes
onto argue that if the order in the San Bernardino case were to go into effect there is no way to
roll that decision back. If the order moves forward , then Pandora's box opens and there is no
limit to what the government can force the private sector to do.
In its brief Privacy International and Human Rights Watch argues that:
"Sec urity features - including encryption and other measures - are integral
to the protection of civil and human rights. Countries may seek to compel
technology companies to impair security for illegitimate purposes , including to
stifle expression, crush dissent, and facilitate arbitrary arrest and torture. In these
societies, secure technologie s protect all members of society but especially
vulnerable ones - such as journalists , human rights defenders , and political
activists - by giving them a safe space to communicate, research , and organize .
47
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The U.S. , by compelling technology companies to roll back these protections ,
risks exposing the millions of individuals who reside and work in these places to
abuse by their governments. "
If private firms are responsible for protecting national security , how are they going to be

adequately able to protect their customers? The question would then become can private industry
serve two masters: national security and their bottom line This brief puts the implicat ions of this
case into a more globalized perspective. The world is watching. There is no way of knowing
what will play on the world stage if the needs of the intelligence community are allowed to
dictate what private fitms have to do with their technology here in the United States. What will
other more hostile countries force their private sectors to do? The question that needs to be asked
is if the country is ready to set that kind of precedent not only for ourselves but for the world.
The last brief that should be noted here is an amicus brief filed jointly between Microsoft,
Amazon.com, Box , Cisco, Dropbox, Evemote, Facebook , Google , Mozilla, Nest Labs, Pinterest ,
Slack , Snapchat , WhatsApp and Yahoo. These companies , which are normally fierce competitors
within the marketplace, came together in unity , reflecting their deep , "shared concerns about the
potential ramifications of this case for technology and for our customers. At stake are
fundamental questions about privacy, safety , and the rule of law."
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The amicus brief that was

filed also called into question the veracity of the All Writs Act argument. In part the brief argues
that,
"The com1 order in supp011 of the FBI request cites the All Writs Act, which was
enacted in 1789, and last significantly amended in 1911. We believe the issues
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raised by the Apple case are too important to rely on a naITow statute from a
different technological era to fill the Government's perceived gap in cuITent law.
Instead we should look to Congress to strike the balance needed for 21st century
technology. "49
This is not the only brief that brings up whether or not the courts should be the ultimate deciding
factor in this case. This brief (and others) have questioned the ripeness of this issue for the
judicial branch when it has yet to be addressed by the legislative branch of the government.
Many believe that this issue should be legislated on before it comes into the hands of the courts.
These are ju st a few examples of arguments brought up in the amicus briefs submitted on
Apple's behalf , but all of them hit on some of the same themes. The government cannot use the
All Writs Act to mandate that the private sector be held responsible for the protection of
international security.

D) Conclusion:
Something to remember: while some of the cases discussed in this text are not directly
related to national security they pose the same legal arguments and questions that cases involving
national security due. In addition , any decision rendered on cases relating to or not relating to
national security within this same fact pattern have helped to provide a framework for the
question that is being addressed in this text.
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PART FOUR: ANSWERING THE QUESTION
The future of this question might be unknown , but there is an an swer to the question right
now. Based on the research and legal arguments presented at thi s time , it is not the respon sibility
of the private sector to help protect national security by virtue of providing aid to the intelligence
community. The cou11s have thus far not compelled the private sector to do so and the privat e
sec tor has not chosen to do so voluntarily. In cases directly related to national security and in
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cases with similar fact pattern s the courts have said it is not the respon sibility of the private
secto r to act, with one exception. In the San Bernardino case Apple was ordered to comply with
the FBI, but the case was dropped and the order withdrawn. As such no company within the
private sector has been compelled to help protect national security. Now some would argue that
it is everyone's job to help protect national security, and to an extent it is. But as of now it is not
the responsibil ity of the private secto r to either provide proprietary technology or create
technology that will help the intelligence community protect national security, so to that extent it
is not the job of the private sector to help protect national security.

PART FIVE: MOVING FORWARD
Whil e it is not ctmently the private sectors responsi bility to help protect national security,
there is no certainty that this will be the case forever , a ruling may come down or a law may be
passed where it does become the responsibility of the private sector to help prot ect national
security. So the best thing that the private sector can do is be prepared for likely legal outcomes,
and take steps now to prepare for a future that is uncertain.

32

A) Likely Legal Outcomes
This section addresses the mo st likely legal courses of action that will happen moving
forward regarding this issue.
First, there is no way that this issue is going to go away on its own. From September of
2015 to February of2016 Apple has objected to or otherwise challenged at least twelve
government requests to help extract data from locked iPhones. There are cun-ently nine cases
from those twelve that are still pending before the comts at the time of this writing. And those
are just cases involving Apple. Microsoft has also gone to comt over similar questions regarding
compliance when it comes to cowt orders. So what happens next?
At the time of this writing the , neither of the parties involved in Case Study 1 (regarding
the Iphone of the shooter in the San Bernardino Attack) plan to refile or appeal any decision
reached in the case. As for Case Study 2 (regarding the Iphone of a drug trafficker) the
Department of Justice (DOJ) has made public statements that they plan to appeal the decision of
Judge Orenstein to deny the motion to compel Apple to unlock the Iphone of the suspect in the
case. At this time, no fwther information could be found regarding a further appeal, however the
DOJ has said that the case is ongoing.
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Prior to the ruling and subsequent dismissal of the San Bernardino case experts were
saying that , "No matter who wins, an appeal is vi1tually certain. Apple CEO Tim Cook has
vowed to challenge the government ' s order to the Supreme Court, citing it as a threat to
consumer privacy and cyber securit y. The Justice Department has also signaled that the issue

50

Brandom , Russell. "Department of Ju stice appeals rulin g in New York iPho ne unlock ing case ." The Verge . Marc h
07 , 2016. Accessed May 05 , 2017. https ://www .theverge.com /2016 /3/7/ 11176566/ap ple-fbi-en cry ption -appea l-newyork .

33

merits scrutiny by a higher court".
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Now this never happened as the case was dismissed , but

had the case not been dismissed and the ruling of Judge Pym compelling Apple to assist the FBI
been staid on appeal there would be two different courts in two different districts saying to
different things. You would have the California judge ruling (in essence) that private companies
are responsible for helping protect national security and you would have a New York judge
saying that private companies are not responsible for helping police in a crimina l prosecution.
While this not a technical circuit split, it had the potential to become one. And there is no reason
to believe that it might not come to that eventually . With nine other cases pending before the
courts , there is still very much a chance that a circuit spit could occur increasing the likelihood
that the issue will come before the Supreme Comi.
If the case comes before the Supreme Comi, there is no telling what will happen. It will
depend on the make-up of the Court , the case presented before the Court, and the need for
expediency (depending on the case brought before the Court). It will depend on the ability of the
given agency to justify the order that they seek under the All Writs Act. The Supreme Court case
will come down to the All Writs Act. There are constitutional arguments involved in this case
but it is the All Writs Act that has been the central argument of prosecutors seeking orders to
compel the assistance of tech companies. It has also been the All Writs Act that has resulted in
rulings against agencies seeking the help of the tech industry. The government has not been able
to make the case stick (with the exception of San Bernardino) when it comes to the All Writs
Act. If they can do it then they have a fighting chance, but the decisions that have been handed
down, thus far, in cases discussed in this text as well as others not discussed here, have sided
with the private sector.
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The Court will rule in one of the following ways: it will either say that it is responsibility
of the private sector to aid the intelligence community; it is not the responsibility of the private
sector; or they will say that it should be the issue of Congress and request Congressional action.
One of these things will happen, but at this time it is not clear which one.
There is also the chance that Congress could choose to act in the matter and remove the
decision from the cowis entirely, as some believe Congress should. Judge Orenstein in his ruling
from Case Study 2 writes , "Congress should decide how much cooperation Apple should be
forced to give in the encryption case. Using the All Writs Act to force Apple to unlock an
encrypted phone would transform the law "into a mechanism for upending the separation of
powers by delegating to the judiciary a legislative power bounded only by Congress's superior
ability to prohibit or preempt. "
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While there is no rhetoric coming from Congress that they are

willing to take up this issue at this time, another high profile incident like San Bernardino might
force Congress to act rather than wait for a case to make its weigh up to the Supreme Court.
Looking at the likely legal outcomes the one and only thing that is ce1iain is that this issue
is not going away anytime soon.

B) Preparing for the Unknown
Because the legal outcomes of fmiher cases are unknown, and because the answer to the
question of who is responsible for helping protect national security may change , it is imp01iant
for the private sector to try and staii preparing now for what may come.
a. Things to Consider
There are some important things that the private sector needs to be considering now before
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anything changes regarding the relationship between the private sector and the intelligence
community. First, companies in the private sector , particularly in the tech industry , need to pick
a side on this issue and they need to do so now. As was stated previously there are as many if
not more unknown enemies to the United States than there are known. There is no telling where
the next tenorist attack will come from and there is no telling which company will be impacted
by that ten-or attack. So in the event that they are impacted, companies need to make a decision
now as to whether or not they will choose to hand over their technology or create new
technology in the interest of helping protect national security. Depending on what they choose
to do they will need to be ready for a fight. Support needs to be garnered from within the
company now to prepare for any potential backlash that may come no matter what the decision
of a company is.
The next thing that the private sector needs to consider is public perception . When Apple
refused to help the FBI some saw the move as a marketing ploy ; others saw it as a genuine
concern for their customer ' s privacy rights; and some presidential nominees called for a
boycott of all Apple products resulting in backlash from members of the republican party. 53
Despite the array of opinions regarding the Apple's refusal, public perception of the move was
for the most part positive as people are starting to want more of their own privacy back from the
federal government. However, companies that choose to refuse to help the intelligence
community are walking a very fine line when it comes to public perception of the issue. For
example , what would have happened if the iPhone that belonged to the San Bernardino shooter
instead belonged to one of the terrorists that orchestrated 9/ 11.There is little doubt that public
perception of Apple would change dramatically if Apple had refu sed to aid the FBI under those
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circumstances. Some could view the decision of the private sector as unpatriotic. What is
important for companies to understand is that they are walking a tight rope when it comes to the
public' s perception of this issue. So company 's need to be prepared for a changing tide , because
there may come a day where fellow industry members may support a given decision but
customers do not.
Lastly , the government is not the same as it was when this issue was in the spotlight in
2016 . In February 2016 President Obama sided with the intelligence community on the issue of
whether or not Apple should help the FBI, but saw that there was the potential for harm in doing
so.
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In contrast , then Candidate Trump called for a boycott of Apple products. Candidate

Trump is now President Trump and Republicans now have control of both the House and
Senate. Companies who are trying to make the decision of whether or not be responsible for
helping protect national security are facing a very different political climate than when the issue
was a hot topic. For companies in the private sector all this means is that they need to know and
under stand who they will be up against , no matter what side of the issue they come down on.
They need to under stand that the next time this issue comes up it will probably end up before
the Supreme Court or Congress.
b. If the status quo stays the same ...

If the status quo stays the same and the private sector is not held liable for helping to protect
national security , th en the intelligence community will have to turn to third paiiies or one of their
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1,931 private companies to get needed information.

55

A prime example is the San Bernardino

case, the only reason that the case was dropped was because Apple found someone else to unlock
the phone. So, that also means that the technology that Apple did not want to create for fear of it
getting misused by the government , is technology that the government now has. This means that
Apple will need to either once again upgra de its encryption software or try to now compel the
FBI to turn over the software that gave them access to the phone. From there Apple will have to
re-adapt its own software . In other words, the situation has now evolved from both Apple and the
FBI standing outside the locked door to just Apple standing outside the locked door of getting
customers infmmation. Now Apple will have to spend time , spend money, and re-task valuable
researc h and development perso1mel so that Apple can relock the door and keep government out
of reach of the key that it has worked so long and hard to try and keep out of rea ch of the
intelligence community and itself.
c) If the status quo changes ...

If the status quo changes and companies are held responsible for helping protect national
security then they will face an entirely different set of problems. As a result of the change
companies will be forced to either hand over their technolog y or create technology when ordered
to do so by the comts. This mean s handing over technology that could be leaked to other
companies, thu s losing its value - or it could mean giving government blanket access to every
phone in the country; which then gives the intelligence conununity the potential for mi susing the
teclmology. If this occurs it will force companies to spend the time to create new softwa re or
spend the time creating software that will only give the intelli gence community access to one
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phone. In order to do this and comply with a given comi order companies will either spend
significant amounts of their own research and development budgets or wait to be reimbur sed by
the government. No matter what the private sector would be significantly impacted by a change
of the status quo and companies need to be aware of the impact s that those changes would have
now, before the status quo changes. In other words, the best defense is a good offense, no matter
what side of the issue a given member of the private sector falls on companies must try and stay
ahead of the curve when it comes to the issue of who is responsible for protecting national
security.

PART SIX: PERSONAL REFLECTION AND AUTHORS BIOGRAPHY
When I first staiied this project I literally had no idea what I was getting myself into. At
the point that I was first starting my project I was ju st finishing my scholar semester for the
Huntsman Scholars Program. Due to my participation in the program I was in teams writing long
papers and doing extensive research, so I thought doing one on my own would not be so bad, and
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doing own on the topic of my choosing meant that it would be even easier than a Scholars
project. I could not have been more wrong.
Writing my honors thesis has been one of the most challenging things I have done in my
academic career. It has also been one of the most rewarding things that I have ever done in my
academic career. The experience that I gained from writing something of this magnitude was
something that I never expected to get out of my college education. When I was a freshman I
never thought that I would be sitting here writing this reflection .
Now let me tell you a little bit about my thesis. When I set out to try and pick a topic for
my thesis I knew that I wanted it to be cross disciplinary and I knew that I wanted it to involve
national security. What I didn ' t know was the struggle that I would face trying to pick a topic. At
this point picking my topic wasn't a priority , unfo11unately like most college students it wasn't
on my radar until about a week before it was due. At this point I reached out to my now mentor
Dr. Shannon Peterson. I do have to say that choosing Dr. Peterson as my mentor and Profe ssor
Ferguson as my committee member was by far the easiest pai1 of my project. Doctor Peterson sat
me down and walked me through my ideas to help find a common thread that I could put
together for a topic.
Once we figured out my topic all I then had to do was right it. Let me pause now to give
my first piece of advice to anyone who is currently in the position of trying to write an honors
thesis. Think about how long it will take you to complete your thesis ... then triple it. It always
looks so much easier at the outset. Because my thesis is primarily literary based I needed sources
and a lot of them. Some sources were easy to find and some were not so easy, but make sure if
your project was literai·y based like mine was give yourself enough time to get into the material.
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I did not start writing my thesis until pretty late in the game, and it would have been a lot
less stressful for everyone involved if I had been writing as I went. What is that saying, do as I
say not as I do. Please don' t make the same mistakes I did. The other mistake that I made in
writing my thesis was that up until the day before it was due I wasn't writing my thesis for me.
Sure , I was passionate about my topic and everything but I was not writing my thesis for me. I
was writing it to graduate with honors. I was so scared that it wasn ' t going to be good enough. I
was so scared that it wasn't adequate to have my committee members ' names on it that it almost
paraly zed me , and I honestly almost didn't finish. I wasn 't writing it for me, I was writing it be
perfect. In reply to an email that I sent to my mentor in almost total panic she told me that
ultimately my thesis was something that I needed to be proud of. That was the moment that had
you been with me you would have seen the light bulb go on over my head. I realized that I had
to do this for myself, I had to finish it for myself , and have it be meaningful and successful for
me.
In that moment, I went from wanting to rewrite the entire thing for a third time (at that
point I had rewritten almost every part twice) to taking a step back and looking at the totality of
what I had written rather than looking at it piece meal, and being overwhelmed with what I had
accomplished. That day and into the next I made last edits on my thesi s, and I could honestly not
be prouder of my final product. I have no doubt that my thesis is not perfect, but it is perfect for
me.
If I could tell a student who is considering writing a thesis any two pieces of advice it
would be these . If you are considering doing an honors thesis, do it, it is well worth your time; if
you are writing it for yourse lf. And find a good mentor , I can honestly say that this project would
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not be completed without Dr. Peterson. Dr. Peterson if you are reading this, thank you! There is
no way I could have done this without you.
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